An empirical test of the rent-shifting hypothesis: the case
of state trading enterprises
Stephen F. Hamilton a , Kyle W. Stiegert b
a

b

Department of Economics, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816 -1400, USA
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison,
WI, USA

Abstract
A central result in the theoretical literature on strategic trade is the ‘rent-shifting
hypothesis’, the idea that government’s can employ trade policy as a precommitment device
to transfer profit from foreign to domestic firms. To our knowledge, however, the
rent-shifting hypothesis remains untested empirically. This paper constructs a theory-based
empirical test of rent-shifting behavior that relies on observations of government precommitment variables employed through State Trading Enterprises (STEs). The analysis
applies data on the delayed producer payment structure of the Canadian Wheat Board
(CWB) and examines its merits as a rent-shifting mechanism in the international durum
market. The model fails to reject the hypothesis that the CWB utilizes a pre-commitment
mechanism in the international durum market and several nonparametric tests confirm that
the observed transfer payments set by the CWB are consistent with rent-shifting behavior in
the 1972–95 pre-WTO period.
Keywords: Profit shifting; Vertical separation; New empirical industrial organization

1. Introduction
Beginning with the seminal work of Brander and Spencer (1984, 1985), a large
and growing literature has addressed what has become known as the ‘rent-shifting
hypothesis’, the possibility that government trade policy can be used as a device to
transfer profits from foreign to domestic firms. The theoretical foundation for
strategic trade policy has subsequently developed in several important directions.
Brander and Spencer (1988), Spencer and Jones (1991, 1992), Fung (1995),
Ishikawa and Lee (1997), and Ishikawa and Spencer (1999)), among others,
consider the effect of vertical structure on strategic trade and characterize how
various incentive schemes and patterns of intermediate goods exchange bear on the
optimal rent-shifting policy design. Neary (1994) examines the relationship
between the social cost of public funds, transnational differences in production
costs, and the optimal level of a domestic export subsidy. Dixit (1988) and Qiu
(1995) consider circumstances under which countervailing duties by an importer
provide sufficient deterrence to curtail the rent-shifting activities of an exporting
country. Goldberg (1995) and Karp and Perloff (1995) investigate the strategic
trade implications of limited government commitment, and Bagwell and Staiger
(1994), Maggi (1996) and Brainard and Martimort (1998) examine the effect of
incomplete information on the optimal rent-shifting mechanism. In light of the
considerable theoretical attention devoted to strategic trade policy, it is somewhat
surprising to note that the rent-shifting hypothesis remains untested empirically.1
The goal of the present paper is to provide this link.
The theoretical underpinnings of our approach are as follows. According to the
rent-shifting hypothesis (in any of its various forms), a mechanism must exist for a
government to establish some form of precommitment in the export market.2
Through precommitment to a particular trade policy, the government can then use
an appropriately designed mechanism to shift rent from foreign to domestic firms
by effectively lowering the marginal cost of domestic production (e.g., with a unit
subsidy). In quantity-setting games, the relative unit cost differential between
domestic and foreign firms derived through such a policy leads to a commensurate
output differential that, in an optimally designed precommitment program, is
exactly that which would occur in a Stackelberg leader–follower relationship
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Several papers have estimated mark-ups of price over marginal cost in international markets (see,
e.g., Aw (1992), Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994), and Goldberg and Knetter (1999)). However,
these papers address the degree of international market competition, and not the related questions we
examine here, which are: (i) is there evidence of pre-commitment in the international data, and (ii)
given an estimated level of structural competitiveness of the international market, is the relevant
pre-commitment parameter set at the optimal level to shift-rent?
2
In quantity-setting games, this mechanism is typically an output (or investment) subsidy, although
the treatment extends readily to various other trade instruments, such as tariffs and import quotas.

between domestic and foreign industry groups. The empirical challenge to an
examination of the rent-shifting hypothesis is that the analysis must make a
corresponding conceptual division; the prescription of precommitment precludes
market data from being viewed as the outcome of a single-stage game. Consequently, we divide our empirical analysis into two sections that correspond to each
of the two stages considered in the theory: a precommitment stage, in which a
government chooses the optimal rent-shifting transfer, and an output stage, in
which foreign and domestic marketing agents respond.
Our empirical approach is developed through the use of two procedures, each of
which conforms to an individual stage-game suggested by theory. In the first
procedure, which corresponds to the output stage-game, demand and conduct
parameters are estimated in a segmented international market comprised of two
exporting regions and one importer. The domestic export region, the region
hypothesized to shift rent, is represented by a nationally sanctioned marketing
agent with exclusive control of all domestic output, whereas a group of foreign
marketing agents conducts independent marketing activities in the remaining
export region. We estimate the output stage in the tradition of existing models of
asymmetric cost equilibria (see, e.g., Kahai et al. (1996) and Berg and Kim
(1998)), with one notable difference: government trade policy is considered as a
shift parameter in the domestic marginal cost function. In the second procedure,
which corresponds to the precommitment stage of the theoretical model, we
employ a subset of the output stage results to characterize the value of the trade
policy parameter associated with the optimal degree of rent-shifting. Two
nonparametric statistical approaches (a Wilcoxon signed-rank test and a bootstrap
method) are subsequently utilized to evaluate the relationship between the
estimated optimal and observed transfer payments made between the domestic
government and its marketing agent.
The merits of this empirical approach are 2-fold. First, if the domestic
government does in fact use a form of precommitment in the international market,
then the observed trade policy parameter can be used to derive an initial test of the
rent-shifting hypothesis in the output stage model. Namely, because the reaction of
foreign marketing agents to a change in the quantity of domestic exports is
endogenous in the precommitment stage, this implies that the conduct parameter
associated with the domestic marketing agent, itself, is pre-determined. Indeed, it
is precisely this implicit functional relationship that makes rent-shifting behavior
possible. As we demonstrate in the empirical section of the paper, this determinacy
leads to the following necessary condition for rent-shifting behavior. When the
conduct of the domestic marketing agent(s) is estimated as a free parameter in the
output stage, trade policy is an effective rent-shifting mechanism only if the
conduct parameter is of unit value. The second merit to our approach is that the
parameters estimated in the output stage also define the optimal level at which the
government precommitment variable should be set. Correspondingly, if the
necessary condition for rent-shifting behavior cannot be rejected in the output

stage model, it is possible to calculate the optimal precommitment level and test
whether the observed trade policy parameter is set in a fashion consistent with
theory.
We choose to focus our empirical analysis on the delayed producer payment
system of State Trading Enterprises (STEs). The behavior of STEs in international
markets is well suited to our purpose in several regards. First, unlike the case of
rent-shifting arrangements between a government agent and private firm(s), which
may be complicated by, among other things, strategic delegation issues and
asymmetric information problems, STEs operate through a single marketing board
with the exclusive control of both the instrument for strategic trade (i.e., the unit
transfer price) and the quantity traded. Second, time-series data on STE activities
are publicly available. Finally, apart from reasons of purely analytical convenience, the behavior and practices of STEs are important in their own right. At
least since the Uruguay settlement of GATT, the role and behavior of STEs, which
have reported objectives that include protection of domestic markets from world
market influence and expansion of export market shares, have been a major
concern in the emerging international commitment to free trade (GAO, 1995).
We apply our test of the rent-shifting hypothesis to the international durum
market. International durum trade is an analytically convenient subject to study, as
durum wheat is a relatively homogeneous commodity with a limited number of
global exporters. Over the pre-WTO period 1971–95 that comprises our data,
moreover, the durum market is served by a single STE, the Canadian Wheat Board
(CWB).3 Our principle finding is that the delayed producer payment structure
implemented by the CWB in this period is consistent with rent-shifting behavior.
Further analysis of individual marketing years supplements this result, moreover,
as the actual pre-payment discount implemented by the CWB and the estimated
optimal rent-shifting transfer cannot be statistically differentiated in 17 of 24
sample years.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides
background information that summarizes the current pricing practice of the CWB,
with particular attention directed towards the payment structure in the durum
market. Section 3 presents a theoretical framework that outlines the essential
details of how a delayed producer payment system serves as a rent-shifting device
and derives the central estimation equations we pursue in the empirical portion of
the paper. Section 4 outlines the empirical methodology. Section 5 contains the
estimation results, and, in Section 6, the paper concludes with a brief summary of
our findings and suggestions for future work.
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The CWB is authorized under Canadian law to have near complete autonomy over the marketing,
storage, logistics, and pricing of the nation’s hard wheat, durum and barley exports.

2. State trading enterprises, vertical separation, and precommitment
In the Uruguay settlement of GATT, the current WTO member nations made
significant commitments toward freer trade through tariffication of quotas,
scheduled reductions in internal production and trade distortions, and tightened
definitions of national autonomy in a new hard law framework. A major issue of
concern in this settlement regarded STE activity. In particular, the question arose
as to whether the programs instituted by STEs could be tailored to circumvent the
growing international commitments toward free trade.
In the post-Uruguay period, the US Congress commissioned the General
Accounting Office to conduct two studies investigating and interpreting STE
behavior (GAO, 1995, 1996). In these studies, STEs were shown to use policy
tools that have reasonably clear WTO compliance rules, including production and
import levies, price supports, and export subsidies (GAO, 1996). The reports also
cited several other STE activities that are more problematic under WTO law,
including export licenses, subsidies not tied marginally to a commodity, access to
below-market borrowing rates, tax advantages, transportation subsidies, and
delayed producer payments.
The GAO (1996) study recognized delayed producer payments as a source of
pricing flexibility, because STEs initially set producer payments before final export
marketing conditions are revealed. However, the report failed to draw attention to
another important feature of the delayed payment system: almost exclusively, the
initial payments for commodities brokered by STEs are set at substantially
below-market prices. The large body of literature on vertical separation suggests
that similarly structured payment systems between upstream and downstream firms
are capable of generating the necessary precommitment mechanism to attain a
Stackelberg leadership position (see, e.g., Bonanno and Vickers (1988); Lin
¨ (1997)). By setting a below(1988); Coughlin and Wernerfelt (1989), and Kuhn
market procurement price for a commodity, a legally sanctioned STE is thus able
to shift rent in the export market in much the fashion that a downstream firm in a
vertically structured industry can strategically position itself through use of an
upstream price restraint.4 Moreover, in the case of STEs, the final payment in a
delayed producer payment system, which is typically delivered in lump-sum
fashion, provides an explicit method of transfer back to the input supplier that
rationalizes the system.
The essence of the vertical separation argument, as it relates here, is as follows.
Through an appropriately structured system that employs below-market pricing of
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See Hamilton and Stiegert (2000) for an analysis of the antitrust implications of such vertical
arrangements in international markets.

an upstream product with a linear combination of lump-sum payments and equity
sharing arrangements with the input supplier, a downstream firm can attain the
requisite precommitment for Stackelberg leadership. The delayed payment system
in a STE is of precisely this form: the STE typically pays upstream producers a
below-market price, then later provides lump-sum reimbursement after proceeds
are generated in a downstream international market. Consequently, the delayed
payment approach is capable of creating a credible marginal cost advantage for the
STE in an international market, therein providing the necessary precommitment to
shift rent. The delayed producer payment structure is equivalent in this regard to a
policy of direct export subsidization.
In the particular example we pursue here, the delayed payment system of the
CWB, Canadian durum producers are required to market all output through the
CWB both for domestic consumption and for export. In each year, the initial
payment is announced by the CWB prior to harvest. Fig. 1 highlights the details of
this payment system for durum wheat. In the figure, the total height of each bar is
the price received by Canadian producers in each year, which is the sum of initial,
middle, and final payments provided by the CWB. The lower portion of each bar is

Fig. 1. CWB durum payments, 1971–1995.

the initial payment paid to producers at the time they relinquish the grain, while
the upper portion represents the sum of middle and final payments to producers
after all revenue, net of cost, is determined.
The salient feature of Fig. 1 is that the CWB consistently delays payment for a
substantial portion of the unit value of durum wheat. This deferred portion of the
unit value represents a shift in cost between what is essentially a marginal cost and
a fixed cost component of the CWB. For the reasons mentioned above, which we
lay out more formally in the next section, we take the level of this pre-payment
discount, the difference between the initial payment and the resulting world market
price in each year, to represent the precommitment parameter through which a
rent-shifting outcome obtains.
There are several circumstances of durum trade that are particularly well suited
for a test of the rent-shifting hypothesis. First, the CWB is the major international
player in the durum market. As the sole Canadian exporter for durum wheat, the
CWB has maintained a 40–60% export market share over the past several decades
(International Wheat Council). Relative to the other commodities sold under its
auspice, moreover, which include hard wheat and barley, the CWB channels a
larger share of its durum to export markets: for example, in the 1988–1995 period,
only 5–8% of the durum crop was sold domestically. Second, unlike the
international hard wheat and barley markets, in which the Australian Wheat Board
and Australian Barley Board operate their own delayed producer payment
programs, the CWB does not compete with other STEs in the durum market.
Finally, only limited substitution is possible for durum in its primary end-uses of
semolina flour and pasta formulas. These elements of the durum market allow us
to implement a relatively straightforward empirical approach.

3. Theoretical structure
This section provides a conceptual framework to identify the important features
of the delayed producer payment system as a rent-shifting mechanism. Throughout, attention is confined to circumstances in which a single STE operates in the
international market, which conforms with our empirical development of CWB
behavior in the next section.
Consider a global export commodity that is produced in two production regions,
a domestic region, in which operations are organized through a STE, and a foreign
region composed of n independent producers. Global production of the export
commodity is structured in a vertical system comprised of an upstream input
market in each country and a single downstream international market. For analytic
simplicity, upstream firms produce the input at constant unit costs of c D and c F in
the domestic and foreign country, respectively, and each downstream marketing

agent serves as a pure intermediary in the production of the finished product.5 We
further assume that the domestic STE has exclusive control over all input
purchases and has the authority to set the upstream market price in a procurement
contract, the details of which are specified in some detail below. In the foreign
region, downstream marketing agents are constrained to purchase the input on the
spot market, as would be the case when legal restrictions prevent the explicit
control of upstream market prices. For example, antitrust legislation in the US
limits the ability of a marketing agent to set the input price through an upstream
price restraint.6
Strategic interaction between the marketing agents is modeled as a two-stage
game. In the first stage, the precommitment stage, the STE selects an upstream
transfer price, w, for the product. Participation by upstream producers in the
market is mandatory at this price. In the second stage, the STE and the foreign
marketing agents compete in quantities in an international oligopoly market. At the
conclusion of this output stage, proceeds acquired by the STE through international durum sales are returned in a lump-sum fashion to the upstream producers.7
Let Q represent total output of the final good and denote the downstream
inverse demand function as P(Q), which is assumed throughout to be strictly
decreasing and twice continuously differentiable. Downstream marketing costs are
assumed to be linear in output and are henceforth subsumed into the market price.
Finally, we impose the stability condition
P9(Q) 1 QP0(Q) , 0

(1)

which, as demonstrated by Novshek (1985), ensures the existence of equilibrium.
The model is solved using backward induction. In the output stage, the STE
seeks to
Max pDs qD , Q, wd 5sP(Q) 2 wd qD
qD

(2)

where pD and qD denote the level of profit and output for the STE in the export
market, respectively, and w is the transfer price set in the precommitment stage.
Maximization of (2) with respect to qD yields the first-order necessary condition:
P(Q) 1 qD P9(Q) 2 w 5 0

(3)

Next, let qF i represent the output of foreign marketing agent i in the export
5
As will be made clear in a moment, this distinction between the input market and final product
market is motivated purely for expositional convenience.
6
For a detailed discussion of US antitrust law that governs transactions in vertically structured
markets, see Perloff et al. (1996).
7
Because the STE acts as a cooperative, the profit maximizing transfer price is independent of the
level of the lump-sum transfer; hence the size of the final transfer payment can be suppressed without
loss of generality.

market. Letting n denote the number of foreign agents, the aggregate output of
foreign firms is qF 5 o in51 qF i . For foreign marketing agent i, the objective
function in the output stage is

pF i (qF i , Q) 5sP(Q) 2 c Fd qF i ,
which yields the first-order condition
P(Q) 1 qF i P(Q) 2 c F 5 0

(4)

Equilibrium in the output stage is found by simultaneously solving the n 1 1
equations described in (3) and (4).
To achieve greater analytic tractability, the remainder of the paper confines
attention to the case of symmetric foreign firms, qF i 5 (1 /n)qF ,;i. In this case, the
above system of equations can be simplified by aggregating the n first-order
conditions (4), which yields the first-order condition for a representative marketing
agent
P(Q) 1 (1 /n)qF P9(Q) 2 c F 5 0

(5)

The equilibrium export volume of the final good from domestic and foreign
marketing agents, denoted qi (w, c), i 5 D, F, and the total quantity sold in the
export market, Q(w, c), are obtained by solving (3) and (5) simultaneously.
In the precommitment stage, the STE selects the transfer price, w, so as to
Max pD (w) 5sP(Q(w, c)) 2 cd qD (w, c).
w

Letting w* denote the solution to this problem, the upstream price set by the STE
in the optimal rent-shifting program is
≠qF
w* 2 c D 5 2 q *D P9(Q*) ] (q D* , Q*) , 0
≠qD

(7)

where
≠qF
21
]
(q * , Q*) 5 (nP9(Q*) 1 q F* P0(Q*))[(n 1 1)P9(Q*) 1 q F* P0(Q*)]
≠qD D
is the ratio of comparative statics of (3) and (5) implied by the STE’s choice of w,
and where the inequality in (7) holds by stability condition (1). In expression (7),
the profit-maximizing upstream price set by the STE specifies that domestic
upstream producers sell the input at a price below marginal cost, which increases
domestic market share in the international market in an analogous fashion as a
domestic output subsidy.

4. Empirical methodology
In a standard empirical industrial organization model, the theoretical underpinning of the market equilibrium is a simultaneous-move game comprised of
homogeneous firms (for a review, see Bresnahan (1989)). For our purposes, we
extend this framework to consider an international market equilibrium composed
of two exporting groups: the CWB and a composite group of symmetric foreign
marketing agents that operate without the services of a STE.
Our statistical approach begins with estimation of the output stage model. For
empirical purposes, we write the conjectural variations counterparts to (3) and (5)
with the use of conduct parameters.8 The conjectural variations model arises by
assuming each firm views industry output Q as a function of it’s own output qi ,
which modifies (3) and (5) as
P 1 qc P9sdQ / dqcd 2 w 5 0,
P 1 qoe P9sdQ / dqoed 2 c oe 5 0,
for the CWB and the composite group of other exporters, respectively, which we
hereafter denote with the subscripts c and oe. Noting that dQ / dqi 5 dqi / dqi 1
dq2i / dqi , where 2i refers to the combined output of all marketing agents other
than i, and letting m 5 c c 2 w denote the markdown payment of the CWB, the
conjectural variations counterparts to (3) and (5) are
P 1 qc P9 lc 2 c c 1 m 5 0,

(39)

P 1 qoe P9 loe 2 c oe 5 0,

(59)

where li 5 1 1 yi is a conduct parameter and the variable yi ; (dq2i / dqi ),
accordingly, is the so-called ‘conjectural variation.’ In Eqs. (39) and (59), the
departure of li from unit value is a logically consistent test of whether the
Cournot–Nash model provides an accurate description of the industry equilibrium.
Under the rent-shifting hypothesis, the optimal markdown payment of the CWB in
(39), denoted m*, is defined by m* 5 c c 2 w* in accordance with (7).
Our approach essentially is to estimate Eqs. (39) and (59). However, an
econometric problem arises in that rent-shifting behavior derives from a previous,
precommitment period in which the optimal markdown payment, m*, is determined through the use of output-stage information. A two-step method corrects
for this problem. In the first step, the value of m in (39) is taken as the observed
8

It is well understood that the conduct parameter framework has no valid dynamic foundation.
However, it provides a convenient way to characterize the spectrum of oligopoly outcomes and it is
commonly used in empirical industrial organization studies. Genesove and Mullin (1998) provide a
good discussion of the possibilities and limitations of the conduct parameter approach.

¯ and price and cost
markdown payment set by the CWB, which we denote m,
information is employed to estimate conduct parameters for the CWB and foreign
¯ represents the actual
marketing agents in the output-stage model. Because m
markdown payment instituted by the CWB in each sample year, moreover, this
procedure yields unbiased estimates of the various market parameters. In the
second step, the estimated output stage results are used to recover the optimal
rent-shifting markdown in the precommitment stage and nonparametric statistical
tests are applied to evaluate the relationship between the estimated optimal and
observed markdown payments set by the CWB.
The two-step approach outlined above has several advantages. First, if the CWB
employs its delayed producer payment system to obtain an optimal rent-shifting
position in the international market, as we hypothesize, then we should observe a
zero conjecture for the CWB in the output stage (i.e., nc 5 0). Indeed, if the CWB
set its initial payment level according to (7) in the precommitment period, the
conjectural variation parameter is precisely the information that is subsumed into
the optimal markdown payment, m*.
To derive this result more formally, it is helpful to integrate the two stages of
the CWB problem into a single marketing problem, from which we obtain the
first-order condition
P 1 qc (1 1 nc ) 2 c c 5 0.
If the CWB does not employ delayed producer payments as a rent-shifting
mechanism, so that information from the precommitment stage is ignored, the
markdown payment m in (39) is a pure monetary transfer that has no real
economic effect on industry competitiveness. If the CWB operates an optimal
rent-shifting program, however, then from (7), unit production costs relate to the
procurement price according to c c 5 w* 1 qc nc , which implies
P 1 qc (1 1 nc ) 2 c c 5 P 1 qc 2 w* 5 0.
Substituting in for the definition of the optimal markdown payment, m* 5 c c 2 w*,
yields
P 1 qc 2 c c 1 m* 5 0
which is equivalent to (39) only when lc 5 1.
The determinacy of the CWB ‘conjecture’ under rent-shifting behavior provides
a testable implication in the output stage model. If CWB conduct is estimated as a
free parameter in an output stage in which the marginal cost of the CWB is shifted
¯ then, under the rent-shifting
downward by the observed markdown payment, m,
hypothesis, lc 5 1 should obtain.
If the hypothesis of leadership behavior is not rejected in the output stage, a
second testable implication derives in the precommitment stage model. In
particular, based on the relationship between the observed payment set by the
CWB in the upstream durum market and the estimated optimal markdown

¯ is consistent with
payment calculated from (7), it is possible to assess whether m
the profit-maximizing level of precommitment. Standard nonparametric statistical
¯ and m*.
methods can then be applied to investigate the relationship between m
To complete the specification of the empirical model, we consider international
demand for durum given by the isoelastic demand equation, P 5 a Q 1 / ´ , where
´ , 0 is the price elasticity of demand. Substituting (39) and (59) in the calculation
of (7) and making use of the fact that QP9 /P 5 1 /´ and QP0 /P9 5 (1 2 ´) /´, the
optimal markdown, m*, is characterized by

S

2 S *c P
m* 5 c c 2 w* 5 ]]
´

´ 1 l S * (1 2 ´)
DS]]]]]]]]
(1 1 l )´ 1 l S * (1 2 ´) D
oe

oe

oe

oe

(8)

oe

* 5 o i 51 s qoe,i /Qd is the
where S *c is the export market share of the CWB and S oe
combined market share of other exporters. For given estimated values of the
demand elasticity and the conduct parameter of the other exporters loe in the
output stage of the model, expression (8) generates the estimated optimal
markdown payment for each marketing year.
n

5. Estimation and results
Our analysis begins with the estimation of the output stage model. In the output
stage, we consider a three-region trade model in which the CWB and the aggregate
US–EU other exporter region constitute two distinct net export regions and the
rest of the world (ROW) are treated as net importers. All equations are expressed
in log linear form, which corrects for the perfect collinearity problem of the linear
Bresnahan model (see Perloff and Shen, 1999) and is consistent with our
specification of the demand relation (8). We describe the demand and supply
equations for the importing region (i.e., ROW) as follows:
Drow 5 a 0 1 a 1 Pd 1 a 3 Yrow 1 a 3 Pr 1 a 4 (P *d Pr ) 1 ´a

(9)

Srow 5 b 0 1 b 1 Pd[21] 1 b 2 ACrow[21] 1 b 3 Pb[21] 1 ´b

(10)

where Srow and Drow are production and consumption of durum in the ROW
region, respectively, Pd is the international price of durum, Yrow is national income
in the ROW region, Pr is the price of a key a substitute product (rice), ACrow is
durum acreage planted, and Pb is the price of a production substitute (barley), and
´a and ´b are random disturbance terms. The [21] subscripts refer to variables
lagged one period, which reflects the fact that durum supply decisions in a given
year are determined prior to the marketing period, and hence depend on lagged

values of prices and acreage.9 The excess demand relation for the ROW is
characterized by EDrow ; Drow 2 Srow , which, making use of (9) and (10), we
express in price-dependent form as:

S

D

1
Pd ]]] (EDrow 2 a 0 1 b 0 1 b 1 Pd[21] 2 a 2 Yrow 2 a 3 Pr
a 1 1 a 4 Pr
1 b 2 ACrow[21] 1 b 3 Pb[21] ) 1 ´ab

(11)

Suppose the two net export regions, Canada and OE, select quantities so as to
equate perceived marginal revenue with marginal cost in (39) and (59). Confining
attention to such cases allows for simultaneous identification of the supply
relationship and conduct parameter based on exogenous rotations of the excess
demand curve through the interaction term P d* Pr in (9). Moreover, because the
supply relation (10) does not depend on current year price information, the
estimated demand elasticity in the ROW region is identical to that of imported
durum.
For the OE region, net exports are specified in a similar fashion as above.
However, an important distinction is that we consider stocks holding activities in
the excess supply relation. The supply, demand and stocks equations for the OE
region are specified as
Doe 5 c 0 1 c 1 Pd 1 c 3 Yoe 1 a 3 Pr 1 a 4 (P *d Pr ) 1 ´c

(12)

Soe 5 d 0 1 d 1 Pd[21] 1 d 2 ACoe[21] 1 d 3 Pb[21] 1 d 4 BST oe 1 ´d

(13)

EST oe 5 e 0 1 e 1 Pd 1 e 2 BST oe 1 ´e

(14)

where BST oe and EST oe denote beginning and ending stocks, respectively, and all
other variables are defined as in the case of the ROW above. In (14), ending stocks
are modeled as a function of beginning stocks and the contemporaneous price of
durum. Making use of (12)–(14), the following identity is used to calculate excess
supply in the OE region (ESoe ):
Soe 1 BST oe ; Doe 1 EST oe 1 ESoe

(15)

The excess supply equation also includes a shift term that captures the equilibrium
deviation of price from marginal cost represented in (59), which implies, upon
gathering equations, that
9

The use of lagged acreage is conceptually similar to the use of a lagged supply term but, by
removing weather related output factors, better captures the previous period’s production commitment.

S

21
Pd 5 ]]]]
c 1 1 c 4 Pr 1 e 1

Ds

ESoe 1 c 0 2 d 0 1 eo 2 d 1 Pd[21] 2 d 2 ACoe[21] 2 d 3 Pb

1 (1 1 c 4 2 e 2 )BST oe 1 c 2 Yoe 1 c 3 Prd

S

D

1
2 loe ESoe ]]] 1 ´cd ,
a 1 1 Pr a 4

(16)

where loe is the conduct parameter for the OE, ´cd is a random disturbance term,
and all other variables are as previously defined.
For the Canadian region, the supply, demand, stocks and excess supply
equations are analogous to those of the OE region in (12)–(16), with one
exception. The marginal cost facing the wheat board in the output stage is reduced
¯ as specified by (39). Proceeding as above
by the observed markdown payment, m,
yields the estimation equations
Dc 5 f0 1 f1 Pd 1 f3 Yc 1 f3 Pr 1 f4 (P d* Pr ) 1 ´f

(17)

Sc 5 g0 1 g1 Pd[21] 1 g2 ACc[21] 1 g3 Pb[21] 1 g4 BST c 1 ´g

(18)

EST c 5 h 0 1 1 Pd 1 h 2 BST c 1 ´h

(19)

¯
Pd 1 m

S

21
5 ]]]]
f1 1 f4 Pr 1 h 1

Ds

ESc 1 f0 2 g0 1 ho 2 g1 Pd[21] 2 g2 ACc[21] 2 g3 Pb

1 (1 1 g4 2 h 2 )BST c 1 f2 Yc 1 f3 Prd

S

D

1
2 lc ESc ]]] 1 ´fg .
a 1 1 a 4 Pr

(20)

The data necessary to estimate the model are acquired as follows. International
prices, acreage, consumption, production, trade, beginning and ending stocks for
the various hard wheat commodities are obtained from World Wheat Statistics. Per
capita income for each region is calculated using GDP data reported in International Financial Statistics and population data in the United Nations Population
Database. Finally, the (real) international prices of barley and rice are obtained
from North American export values available in the United Nations Trade
Database and deflated using the industrialized nations producer price index
reported in International Financial Statistics.
The system of equations above is estimated for the durum market over the
pre-WTO period 1971–1995.10 Since Eqs. (9)–(20) represent a nonlinear simulta-

10

In light of the fact that the US began investigating the trade implications of STE behavior in 1995
(see GAO (1995, 1996)), we confine attention to prior years.

neous equation system, they are estimated using nonlinear three-stage least squares
(N3SLS). The exogenous variables in the system are used as instruments and
convergence is obtained from various groups of starting values.
The estimation results are presented in Table 1. The important feature to note in
the table is that each parameter estimate essential to our test of the rent-shifting
hypothesis is of the correct sign and of a magnitude that conforms either with
theory or to previous research. In particular, the coefficients that jointly determine
the world demand elasticity in the ROW region, a 1 and a 4 , are both significant.
Based on these values, the estimated demand elasticity in the durum export market
(evaluated at the mean price of rice) is 22.1612 and is significant at the 0.01 level.
Using the observed price of rice at each data point, the elasticity of international
durum demand varies in a range between 22.50 to 21.50 over the sample
period.11 The ROW cross-price elasticity with rice, estimated at the mean durum
price, is positive, which conforms to expectations that rice and durum are
substitutes in consumption. Income parameters for Canada and the OE indicate
that durum is a normal good.
Most of the remaining parameters from the supply equations and stocks
equations either conform to expectations or are not statistically significant. The
price of barley, which is included in the model as a production substitute for
durum, is statistically significant in all three regions, but of the wrong sign in the
ROW region. This finding may be due to the fact that barley is a substitute in
Canadian and OE growing regions, but less important to the diverse growing
regions characterized by the ROW. The parameters for beginning stocks in the
ending stocks equations are positive and statistically significant in both export
regions, with magnitudes that indicate more pronounced stocks adjustments in the
US than in Canada. In each case, stocks holding behavior is positively related to
the world export price, which indicates that both regions may attempt to influence
the world market price for durum through grain storage.
The conduct parameters, both for the CWB ( lc 5 1.05) and for the OE region
( loe 5 0.74), are statistically significant, which provides some indication that the
world durum market is noncompetitive. Making use of the output stage estimation
results, moreover, the hypothesis that lc 5 1 cannot be rejected.12 Hence, we fail to
reject the hypothesis in the output stage model that the CWB shifts rent through its
delayed producer payment program.
The estimated conduct of the CWB in the output stage provides a necessary, but

11
To our knowledge, there is no published research that reports estimates of the import demand
elasticity for durum over a comparable period of study. However, empirical evidence in hard wheat and
course grain markets suggests that the import demand elasticities reported here are quite reasonable
(see, e.g., Paarlberg and Abbott (1986), Tyers and Anderson (1988), and Devadoss and Meyers
(1990)).
12
In contrast, a similar test on the conduct parameter for the OE region rejects the hypothesis of unit
value at the 0.05 level.

Table 1
Model estimates for Durum Export Demand 1971–1995
Description

Parameter

Coefficient

t-ratio

ROW (net import) region
Demand intercept
Durum price
ROW income
Rice price
Rice*durum interaction
Supply intercept
Lagged durum price
Lagged acreage
Lagged price of barley

a0
a1
a2
a3
a4
b0
b1
b2
b3

14.6*
25.53*
21.41*
20.97
0.82*
4.24*
20.01
21.04*
0.33*

3.54
24.34
25.17
20.99
2.78
7.26
20.25
23.64
5.13

OE (net export) region
Demand intercept
Durum price
OE income
Rice Price
Rice*durum interaction
Supply intercept
Lagged durum price
Lagged acreage
Lagged price of barley
Beginning stocks
Stocks intercept
Durum price
Beginning stocks

c0
c1
c2
c3
c4
d0
d1
d2
d3
d4
e0
e1
e2

221.20*
4.07
5.12*
20.26
20.49
3.06*
0.11
20.28
20.35*
0.16
21.46*
0.49*
0.82*

22.73
1.99
5.54
20.17
21.07
9.04
1.45
21.64
24.18
1.64
22.85
3.70
5.40

Canada (net export) region
Demand intercept
Durum price
Canada income
Rice price
Rice*durum interaction
Supply intercept
Lagged durum price
Lagged acreage
Lagged price of barley
Beginning stocks
Stocks intercept
Durum price
Beginning stocks

f0
f1
f2
f3
f4
g0
g1
g2
g3
g4
h0
h1
h2

28.61
1.66
2.06*
20.37
20.20
1.91*
20.02
0.12
20.32*
20.46*
21.18*
0.46*
0.28*

21.90
1.44
4.19
21.02
21.13
6.02
20.17
1.16
22.62
29.21
23.53
4.63
4.06

Conduct parameters
Canada conduct
OE conduct

lc
loe

*Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

1.058*
0.742*

4.41
9.46

not a sufficient, condition for rent-shifting behavior.13 Consequently, we next turn
to the question of whether the observed CWB markdown payments are consistent
with the optimal employment of a rent-shifting mechanism in the precommitment
stage.
Fig. 2 compares (in percentage terms) the observed markdown in the durum
¯ with the estimated optimal markdown payment over the 1972–95
market, m,
period, m*. The observed markdown payment in each period is taken to be the
difference between the initial procurement price and the global market price for
durum, while the estimated optimal markdown is based on the relevant output
stage coefficients that comprise Eq. (8). Other than notable exceptions that occur
in the years 1980, 1987, 1990, and 1995, the estimated optimal markdown price
seems to track fairly closely with the observed markdown payments implemented
by the CWB. This provides some casual evidence that the markdown payments set
by the CWB are set at the optimal level to shift rent.
Before proceeding with a more formal analysis of the precommitment stage, we
¯ and m* provides
first assess the extent to which the correspondence between m
evidence to support the optimality of payments in a rent-shifting program. It is
important to note that the calculation of the optimal markdown payment in (8)
relies on the use of estimated coefficients in the output stage model (a 1 , a 4 and
loe ), where each of these parameters, in turn, is conditional on the vector of
¯ For this reason, it is necessary to address the
observed markdown payments, m.

Fig. 2. Percentage comparison of the estimated optimal and actual markdown, 1971–95.
13

Indeed, a unit conduct parameter is also consistent with static, ‘one-shot’ Cournot–Nash
competition.

¯ through the output stage coefficients
extent to which m* is conditioned by m
before inferences are drawn regarding the optimality of the observed markdown
payments.
To evaluate this issue, we calculate the sensitivity of m* to various perturbations
¯ In particular, we re-estimate the output stage model following several
in m.
¯ The conduct parameter and coefficients
percentage magnitude adjustments in m.
that determine the demand elasticity are extremely robust in response to each of
¯ the
these perturbations. For the largest magnitude change, a 20% increase in m,
parameters relevant to our calculation of m*, a 1 , a 4 and loe , decrease in absolute
value terms by 1.38, 1.66 and 0.01%, respectively. The arc elasticity of m* with
¯ is 0.041 for each magnitude of the change, with a range that varies
respect to m
between 0.029 and 0.054 across individual data points (due to variation in output
levels). These results indicate that the calculated value of m* is not highly
¯ in our sample.14
conditional on m
The observed and estimated optimal markdown payments are reported in Table
¯ and m* in each sample year provides
2. The difference between the values of m
the basis for our statistical assessment of the rent-shifting hypothesis in the
precommitment stage. On average, the observed markdown payment set by the
CWB is $26.03, whereas the estimated optimal markdown is $24.14 in the sample
period. Because we have limited knowledge of the underlying distributional
properties of m*, we apply two nonparametric techniques to evaluate the
¯
hypothesis that m5m*.
The first technique employs a standard nonparametric
bootstrap procedure on the system of equations to generate a confidence interval
about m*, which allows the hypothesis of equal markdown payments to be
examined in each sample year.15 The bootstrap is implemented by generating OLS
parameter estimates of the reduced form system and sampling (with replacement)
from the errors of the reduced form equations to create 1000 simulated pseudosamples of the endogenous variables. The simulated endogenous variables are then
introduced into the structural system to generate the vector of structural parameter
estimates necessary to calculate m* in each sample year.
For each marketing year, the third column of Table 2 reports the bootstrap P
¯
value for a test of equal coefficients, m5m*.
In 1980 and 1990, the observed

14
An anonymous referee suggested an alternative way to address this issue. To the extent that an
estimated optimal markdown payment is conditional on the observed markdown payment, suboptimal
behavior may appear to be optimal in the precommitment stage comparison (type II error). To evaluate
this possibility, we uniformly increase each observed markdown payment by $5 (a mean increase of
19.2%) and re-estimate the output-stage model. The calculated values of the optimal markdown
payments differ only marginally from those reported in Table 2 and, correspondingly, the hypothesis
that the suboptimal payment level are optimal is rejected on the basis of the Wilcoxen signed-rank test
(described in detail below).
15
See Efron and Tibshirani (1993) for a general discussion of this approach.

Table 2
Estimated optimal versus observed markdowns by the CWB in the international durum market
1972–1995
Year

¯
m
Observed
markdown

m*
Estimated
optimal
markdown

Bootstrap
P value
(two-sided
alternative)

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

42.08
88.22
74.55
18.00
30.22
16.54
17.07
33.82
0.49
21.79
8.74
17.54
17.13
13.66
13.18
44.02
10.11
9.91
0.00
30.61
28.80
34.27
36.04
17.98

14.18
76.58
62.82
32.29
19.02
24.60
12.19
21.47
32.43
18.11
22.74
22.46
15.54
8.97
8.36
13.65
10.99
15.94
13.48
13.51
8.88
32.44
38.74
82.29

0.0001 ‡
0.8572
0.6818
0.1268
0.0901
0.2076
0.3078
0.1188
0.0150 ‡
0.4654
0.1188
0.7040
0.5028
0.1106
0.1142
0.0000 ‡
0.6100
0.6744
0.0434 ‡
0.0006 ‡
0.0001 ‡
0.6064
0.9920
0.0006 ‡

‡
¯ and m* statistically dissimilar at the 0.05 level;
Values of m
Wilcoxen test statistic: Z score, 20.713; P value, 0.4778.

markdown payment implemented by the CWB is either zero or near zero, which
indicates that a rent-shifting markdown payment was not implemented. Of the
remaining sample years in which a positive markdown is observed, the results fail
to reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients at the 0.05 level in 17 of 22 cases.
Thus, in the majority of years in the sample the markdown payment instituted by
the CWB is not statistically different from the optimal rent-shifting markdown at
the bootstrapped sample means. In four of the five remaining years in which the
hypothesis of equal coefficient is rejected, the observed markdown set by the CWB
exceeded the level necessary to acquire the optimal rent-shifting advantage in the
durum market. Each of these cases corresponds with a strong leadership signal,
although an excessive markdown payment is clearly sub-optimal in context of the

static theoretical structure that frames our approach. Only in 1995, the final sample
year in our study, is the observed markdown payment both significantly different
than zero and below the estimated optimal markdown.16
We next examine the correspondence between the estimated and observed
¯
markdown payments in the entire sample range. The overall agreement between m
and m* in the entire 1972–95 sample range is central to our analysis of the
precommitment stage, particularly when one considers that the final world price is
to some extent uncertain at the time the initial payment is announced.17 In any
given year, exogenous shocks (e.g., output shocks due to weather events) can
potentially occur between the time the initial and final payments are made that
influence the performance of the rent-shifting policy. Provided that the exogenous
shocks are uncorrelated, however, extending the analysis to the entire sample
range dampens the influence of such events, even in a small time series such as
ours.
To address the general relationship between the observed and estimated optimal
markdown payments over the sample period, we employ a Wilcoxen signed-rank
test (see Wilcox (1987)). The Wilcoxen test, which relies on sequentially ranked
¯ and m*is used to generate a Z score for the
differences of the median values of m
18
¯
hypothesis that m5m*.
The result of this test is reported with its corresponding
P value at the bottom of Table 2. With 24 pairs of observations of the ranked data,
we fail to reject the hypothesis that the estimated optimal and observed markdown
payments coincide over the sample period. Thus, the results of the Wilcoxen
signed-rank test suggest that the procurement pricing structure of the CWB in the
precommitment stage is indeed consistent with the rent-shifting hypothesis.19
Several features may explain why our sample involves a higher observed
markdown on average than the estimated optimal markdown payment. First, the
delayed producer payment system may provide ancillary benefits not considered in
our analysis, such as a source of interest-free short-term loans to manage
day-to-day operations of the CWB. Second, the CWB controls both the transfer
price and the quantity marketed for export, which allows greater latitude for
strategic behavior than that which is considered here. Finally, our estimates of the
16
Although we do not wish to press the point here, it is interesting to note that the 1995 marketing
year also corresponds to the first year of the US Congressional investigation into STE behavior (GAO,
1995, 1996).
17
To obtain unbiased parameter estimates in the output stage model, however, it is necessary to
consider the markdown payment as the observed deviation from the actual market price, not the
expected market price.
18
If each difference is from some symmetric distribution, of course, then any inference about the
median also applies to the mean.
19
We also performed two other tests on the relationship of and m*: a simple t-test of the means and
Spearman’s coefficient of rank correlation, neither of which differed significantly from the Wilcoxen
test results.

output stage parameters are based on information from the entire sample period,
whereas the CWB operates on a year-by-year marketing basis. On the whole,
while one should be alert to the possibility of data problems, our findings seem
remarkably consistent with the hypothesis that the delayed payment system of the
CWB serves as a rent-shifting mechanism in the international durum market.

6. Concluding remarks
The purpose of this paper was to derive and implement a general test of
rent-shifting behavior in international markets. Our examination of the international durum market, in which the CWB acts as the sole exporter for Canada, failed to
reject the hypothesis that the pricing structure employed by the CWB is targeted at
the optimal level to shift rent.
The empirical approach we developed here to test the rent-shifting hypothesis
provides a general methodology for the examination of multi-stage games in
non-competitive markets. The empirical analysis was conducted using two
procedures that correspond, in parallel fashion, with each of the two stages of the
theory. In the first procedure, the output stage of the model was estimated using
conduct parameters to describe equilibrium market behavior in an environment
that considered the strategic manipulation of a policy parameter in the domestic
marginal cost relation. A testable implication resulted for these output stage
estimation results. Namely, it was demonstrated that a necessary, though not a
sufficient, condition for rent-shifting behavior is a unit value for the estimated
conduct parameter of the domestic marketing agent. Applied to the role of the
CWB in the international durum market, this hypothesis could not be rejected. The
second procedure relied on information from the precommitment stage that permits
several nonparametric statistical tests to be employed to evaluate the hypothesis
that the observed markdown is consistent with the optimal rent-shifting markdown.
Based on these tests, the hypothesis that the delayed producer payment system of
the CWB is consistent with the optimal rent-shifting policy in the 1972–95 sample
period could not be rejected.
As the trend continues towards greater integration of international markets,
extension of these findings to other markets (and other trade policy parameters) is
essential. Evidence of similar rent-shifting policies in other export markets,
whether instituted by governments through delayed producer payments and export
subsidization programs or by private market mechanisms such as union–management contracts, upstream equity-sharing relations, and strategic delegation, would
provide further validation for the results reported here. Such corroborative
evidence is important as international free-trade agreements continue to be
restructured along the lines suggested by theory.
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